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Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict 






The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of the relation between 
two neighbor countries in Eastern Europe: Romania and Ukraine, in order to un-
derstand the patterns of conflict and cooperation that emerged between them in 
the last fourteen years. While both States can be said geographically belonging to 
Europe, the political aspects of their positioning are not very obvious. Romania is a 
former communist country, placed in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union 
after the Second World War, but having had a ”non-conventional” foreign policy 
during the communist regime. In 2006, as we speak, Romania is a NATO member 
country, and is expecting an answer from the EU as to the date of its accession. 
Ukraine, on the other hand, is a former Soviet Republic which is undergoing a 
rather recent process of democratization which authentically started only with the 
Orange Revolution in 2004. Both countries are, in a certain way, placed in a periph-
eral area, a ”buffer zone”1 between Western Europe and the Russian Federation. 
This is why their relationship is important for international stability from several 
points of view. First, by entering the EU, Romania will have to manage one of the 
Union’s external borders, comprising the border with Ukraine, too2. Secondly, both 
countries are gateways to Central Asia and the Russian Federation, be it for pipe-
lines, trade, or trafficking. Finally, they have a common interest and a common for-
eign policy purpose: getting closer to the Western international organizations and, 
especially for Ukraine (but for Romania too in the first years after 1989), emanci-
pating from dependency on Russia. In spite of this common interest, the relations 
between them have not always been smooth in the last fourteen years. As we will 
try to demonstrate in this paper, historical legacies that hinder this relationship 
were very difficult to overcome. If this finally happened, it is due, on the one hand, 
to the pressures of international organizations, and on the other hand, more re-
cently, to very strong national interest issues, as perceived by the decision-makers. 
Thus, we will try to understand the way in which the relations between the 
two countries evolved from a mutual distrust marked by their historical legacies to 
a more cooperative stance. We will start from the hypothesis that the external envi-
ronment was a very strong factor in influencing the foreign policies of the two 
States towards each other. On the one hand, the external factor will be examined 
from a liberal institutionalist point of view, and we will show that international or-
ganizations have put strong incentives on both States to cooperate. On the other 
hand, we will argue that the external factor can also be addressed from a realist 
point of view, especially in times of crisis, and the case in point will be the energy 
                                                    
1 Martin WIGHT, Power Politics, Leicester University Press, London, 1978, p. 25.  
2 In this context, V.G. BĂLEANU is wondering: ”To what extent will Romania’s north-eastern 
border become the new line of inclusion-exclusion for the new Europe?”, in ”In the Shadow of 
Russia: Romania’s Relations with Moldova and Ukraine”, Conflict Studies Research Centre Working 
Paper, G85, August 2000, p. 16.  
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crisis in Ukraine, in January 2006, when the two States were pushed into coopera-
tion out of fear of Russia. The external factor that influences decision-making is 
doubled by two other variables: historical legacies, which in Central and Eastern 
Europe have an overwhelming weight, and domestic regimes. 
The paper will be organized as follows. In the first part, we will draw a theo-
retical framework which will guide our research into the subject. Then, we will 
analyze the historical legacies that weight on the relationship between Romania 
and Ukraine, and the reasons why it proved rather ambiguous, and even conflict-
ing, in a first phase. Then, we will try to assess the way in which different forms of 
cooperation emerged, and why this happened, insisting on the role of the interna-
tional organizations and the need for survival in an anarchical system. The final 
part of our paper will be dedicated to a general assessment of the impact of the dif-
ferent variables that we took into consideration on the bilateral relations. 
Theoretical Framework 
The main theoretical framework at our disposal in order to study bilateral re-
lations between Romania and Ukraine is foreign policy analysis (FPA). Various 
branches of FPA propose a number of variables which can go to more that 50, in 
certain cases. In an effort to simplify the framework proposed by traditional for-
eign policy analysis, we chose to limit the number of variables that we will take 
into consideration to three. 
An aspect which we consider very important – as in all Central and Eastern 
Europe – is the historical heritage, which, for these countries has not yet been over-
come, like in the case of Franco-German relations. The historical heritage models 
the attitudes of one country to the other, especially in the first years after inde-
pendence, when the two governments do not have any experience on bilateral rela-
tions and must start from a zero point. For the case of Romania and Ukraine, we 
will see that historical heritage was an important factor that hindered cooperation 
in a first stage of bilateral relations. If decision-makers have managed to overcome 
it, it is surprising to still see in the Romanian media allegations based on the ”his-
torical enmity” between the two peoples. Thus, we chose not to insist too much on 
the public opinion as a variable in Romanian and Ukrainian foreign policy deci-
sion-making, as we will briefly assess its minor impact. 
What we took instead into account was the variable of the domestic regime – 
which is, the political color of the different governments that were in power after 
1991. The political color is of interest here inasmuch as it models foreign policy de-
cisions, and not in what concerns internal reforms. This is why we will try to assess 
whether the different governments had a rather pro-Western, neutral or pro-Rus-
sian general orientation. Then, we will see whether there exists a correspondence 
between this general orientation and bilateral relations between the two countries. 
Finally, a variable that always intervenes in foreign policy-making concerns 
external factors that influence decision-making. In our case, we took into consid-
eration the main orientation of the important powers in the system. We did not 
treat separately the USA and the EU member countries, because they share a set of 
common values and norms of international conduct that channels the behavior of 
Romania and Ukraine in the same direction. Thus, even if they were treated 
separately, they would have certainly converged, as both the USA and the EU are 
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interested in stability, cooperation and good relations among the countries in the 
East European region. 
The other main power in the system that impacts on both countries’ foreign 
policy is Russia. For Romania, Russia is a very powerful State in its not very far 
abroad, whose past imperial tendencies have had a great impact on the country’s 
internal regime. In the case of Ukraine, we cannot speak of a simple calculus of 
power: Ukraine is part of Russia’s ”near abroad” and, during the last decade, it 
managed to get into the most important zones of Ukrainian internal politics1. 
Patterns of Conflict: 
The Weight of Historical Legacies as National Interest 
The end of bipolarity brought about instability and allowed old historical lega-
cies to spring out to surface. The relations between Central and Eastern European 
countries and former Soviet Republics are not framed by the Warsaw Pact and the 
strong hold of the USSR anymore. After 1991, they are to be re-built. But the issue 
here is how to find a foundation on which to build the relationship between Roma-
nia and Ukraine. Where to start over? The 1945 situation? But Ukraine did not exist 
as a State then. Actually, the two countries do not have a history of bi-lateral rela-
tions before 1991 at all. This is why it was very difficult to create such a relation-
ship out of nothing. 
Moreover, after 1991, each of the two countries strived for gaining a distinctive 
foreign policy identity. The issue is even more complicated in the case of Ukraine, 
whose problem was one of national identity building tout court, as it existed as an 
independent modern State only between 1918 and 1919. Perceived by everyone as 
naturally belonging to Russia’s sphere of influence2, Ukraine had to fight for its 
own statehood. As for Romania, it was rather reluctant to engage in cooperation 
with its Eastern neighbors3, fearing a resurgence of Russian imperialism. 
This mutual fear comes on the background of historically unstable borders be-
tween Romania and the territory of nowadays Ukraine. Ukraine has inherited from 
the USSR some territories that were part of the ”Greater Romania” in 1918. The 
Union of 1918 is one of the foundational myths of the Romanian State; the yearly 
commemoration of the Union is celebrated as Romania’s national day. These terri-
tories are northern Bukovina, the Hertza county, which seems to have been given 
to the Soviets because, at Yalta, when they drew the frontiers, the pencil of 
Molotov had a bold top, which went over this county, initially not included in the 
negotiations; the Khotyn county, and the South of Bessarabia. All these territories 
belonged to Romania between 1918 and 19404. 
                                                    
1 See Janusz BUGAJSKI, Cold Peace. Russia’s New Imperialism, Westport, Connecticut, Palgrave, 
London, 2004, pp. 79-95. 
2 Anne de TINGUY, ”L’Ukraine, la Russie et l’Occident, de nouveaux équilibres dans une 
nouvelle Europe”, in IDEM (ed.), L’Ukraine, nouvel acteur du jeu international, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 
L.G.D.J., Paris, 2000, p. 10. 
3 Moldova is, here, a case of its own.  
4 We only took into consideration historical events after the creation of the Romanian 
modern State in 1859, as before, the Romanian Principalities were either under Ottoman, Habsburg 
or Russian rule.  
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These territories were mentioned in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, as desired 
by the USSR. They were given to the USSR in 1940, along with the rest of Bessara-
bia, which forms now the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The Paris peace 
Treaty, in 1947, establishing the responsibility of Romania as an aggressor State, 
left them to the USSR. Thus, nowadays Ukraine has more than 40% of the territo-
ries lost by Romania to the USSR in 1940. 
But the most controversial issue here is probably less territorial than economic. 
It’s that of the Serpents’ Island, a very small island (only 17 ha, not inhabited and 
with no water sources) situated near the Romanian town of Sulina, where the Da-
nube flows into the Black Sea. 
The Island belongs to the Romanian state since the Berlin Congress in 1878, be-
ing taken into consideration among the dobrudjan territories that Romania was en-
titled to in exchange for the southern Bessarabia (given to the Russian empire). It 
continued to be Romanian till 1948. The island got to the Soviets in very ambigu-
ous circumstances. It was neither part of the discussion at the moment of the Rib-
bentrop-Molotov Pact, nor in the Paris Treaty, and it was never mentioned as be-
longing to the USSR until the moment of 1948. But in 1948, a team of Romanian 
and Soviet engineers went on the field in order to establish the exact configuration 
of the border, which was to be traced according to the Paris Treaty. It seems that 
the Soviets claimed that the Serpents’ Island should be theirs, and the communist 
Romanian government of Petru Groza signed the Protocol on the trajectory of the 
State frontier between Romania and the USSR, the 4th of February 1948, which fore-
saw that the island was to be part of the USSR. The Romanian or the Soviet Parlia-
ments never ratified this Protocol, and this is the basis on which, after 1991, the Ro-
manian Government contested the legality of this act. 
Being very small, not inhabited and with no water sources, the island did not 
have great importance at the time. But it acquired it after the fall of the Soviet Em-
pire, from several points of view. First, resources of oil and gas were discovered in 
the sea, around the island1. Being located between Romania and Ukraine, the is-
land counts for the delimitation of the territorial waters of each of the two coun-
tries, and by way of consequence, for the exploitation of the underwater resources. 
Moreover, it is significant for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones 
whether the island is inhabited or not; this is why Ukraine sustains it is. And in-
deed it is, in a way, because the Soviets established a strong military basis there, 
which surveyed the naval and aerial traffic in the Black Sea all through the Medi-
terranean. Now, the military facilities belong to Ukraine. But with the 1997 bilat-
eral Treaty, an agreement was reached as to their disaffection. 
Meanwhile, the local mythology went so far as to link (especially by way of ety-
mology) the name of the Serpents’ Island to Atlantis and to trace a history of the is-
land which goes as far as the Trojan war: it seems that Achilles had built some tem-
ples on the island2. Fortunately, this mythology does not have a very large audience 
in Romania; what can be striking is the fact that a Romanian author who writes on the 
international law takes it over when writing about the legal status of the island3. 
                                                    
1 Ştefan DEACONU, Principiul bunei vecinătăţi în dreptul românesc, Editura All Beck, Bucureşti, 
2005, p. 92. For a lengthy overview of the resources in the continental shelf, see George DAMIAN, 
”Insula Şerpilor, piatra de încercare a diplomaţiei româneşti”, in Victor RONCEA (ed.), Axa. Noua 
Românie la Marea Neagră, Editura Ziua, Bucureşti, 2005, pp. 206-209.  
2 www.tomrad.ro/iserpi.  
3 Ştefan DEACONU, Principiul bunei vecinătăţi…cit., pp. 93-94.  
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In 1961 was signed the ”Treaty between the Government of the Popular Re-
public of Romania and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics concerning the regime of the Romanian-Soviet State frontiers, collaboration 
and mutual assistance in problems regarding frontiers”, but this Treaty did not 
contain provisions on the delimitation of the territorial waters, exclusive economic 
areas and continental shelf. During the communist regime, starting with 1967, 
there were several attempts at the delimitation of the territorial waters, the conti-
nental plateau and the exclusive economic areas. The negotiations did not lead to 
an agreement, and they were abandoned in 1987. Thus, there was no bilateral 
treaty between Romania and the USSR concerning the delimitation of the continen-
tal shelf in the Black Sea. 
As showed by the declaration of the Romanian government on the occasion 
of the Ukrainian independence, Romania tried to found the relations with Ukraine 
on the recognition of the injustice done through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 
thus trying to make possible the retrocession of its former territories. Negotiations 
for a political basic Treaty between the two countries were blocked until 1995 
mainly because of the Romanian request for the inclusion of a condemnation of 
the Pact, which would imply the recognition of the injustice of the border. The ini-
tial position of Romania towards Ukraine demanded the denouncement of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and a solution to the problem of the Serpents’ Island, 
which, according to the Romanian part, did not legally belong to Ukraine. This 
radical position slowly changed in time, and one should look for the causes of the 
change. On the other hand, Romania was interested in not having a direct border 
with the Russian Federation, and, by way of consequence, in a real independence 
of Ukraine. This interest develops in the middle of the 1990’s, along with an inter-
est of all the Western countries in having a democratic Ukraine between the Euro-
pean Union and Russia. 
But during these first years, the stake was greater for Ukraine, which was 
struggling for its own survival as a State. The position of Ukraine towards Roma-
nia can only be understood in the broader context of regional relations among Rus-
sia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania. 
Firstly, Ukraine has a problem of national identity. Medieval historiography 
calls Ukrainians ”the little Russians” (along with ”white Russians” – the popula-
tion of nowadays Belarus, and Russians), since the XIth century, while the name 
Ukraine seems to signify, etymologically, ”border land”, ”periphery”1. Moreover, 
just like the majority of former Soviet Republics, it had on its territory a very large 
Russian minority: around 22%, while the percentage of Russian native speakers 
was even bigger: 33%2. The Russian minority is concentrated in the industrialized 
East, while ethnic Ukrainians populate the agrarian West, where there are also im-
portant Romanian, Hungarian and Slovakian minorities. At the moment of the dec-
laration of independency, the Western countries manifested a lot of skepticism as 
to its possibilities of real autonomy3. This is why Ukraine had to prove, first of all, 
its capacity to be a real player in the regional system. 
                                                    
1 See Alain RUZE, Ukrainiens et Roumains, IXe-XXe siècle. Rivalités carpato-pontiques, L’Harmattan, 
Paris, 1999, p. 9.  
2 According to a 1989 counting of the population, quoted in Rainer MUNZ and Rainer 
OHLIGER, ”L’Ukraine post-soviétique: une nation en formation entre l’est et l’ouest”, in Anne de 
TINGUY (ed.), L’Ukraine...cit., pp. 79-107.  
3 Anne de TINGUY, ”L’Ukraine, la Russie et l’Occident….cit.”, pp. 12-15.  
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Secondly, there were territorial disputes with the Russian Federation, too1: 
mostly, the statute of Crimea. Crimea was transferred from the Russian Soviet So-
cialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, on the occasion 
of the 300th anniversary of the ”reunification” between Russians and Ukrainians. 
The peninsula, in which the majority of the population is ethnically Russian, at-
tempted at declaring independence in 1992, but the Crimean Parliament withdrew 
the decision in a few days. One year later, the 9th of July 1993, the State Duma in 
Moscow declared in unanimity Sebastopol, a ”Russian city”. Russia also maintains 
its XIVth army in Transnistria, at the border between Moldova and Ukraine, thus 
having means of military pressure from both East and West. This is especially use-
ful in the context of the Russian foreign policy doctrine of the ”near abroad”, 
which is another way to assert the Russian sphere of influence on the former Soviet 
Republics. It is not difficult to see that territorial claims from both Russia and Ro-
mania, along with the lack of confidence and support from the West, made 
Ukraine feel very threatened in the first years after independence, and to adopt a 
realist approach of international relation relying on self-help2. 
Under these conditions, Ukraine tries to distance itself from Russia, firstly by a 
policy of non-alignment. Some authors even say that ”Ukraine’s drive to escape 
Russian domination was one of the single most important factors behind the col-
lapse of the USSR”3. The newly independent Republic is very reluctant to advance 
with the integration into the Community of Independent States, especially in the 
field of security. Instead, it engages in regional cooperation with other former So-
viet Republics willing to emancipate from Russia, by participating at the informal 
union of GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova), founded in 1997. It also 
enhances cooperation with Poland and Germany, in an attempt to gain an identity 
of central European country: 
”It made the policy of a ’return to Europe’, from which it says was ar-
tificially separated, the central element of an approach that allowed it to 
distance from the USSR and to get closer to the USA and the Western Euro-
pean countries”4. 
Nevertheless, the Russian Federation is and remains, during these years, the 
main economic partner of Ukraine. In 1993-1994, Russia raises the price of the oil 
delivered to Ukraine in order to align to the market prices5. In 1996, a new tax of 
20% is imposed by Eltsin to all importations coming from Ukraine. Russian take-
overs of Ukrainian economic assets were an important trend in 2000-2004. The 
latest development of the energy relation between Russia and Ukraine is the 
                                                    
1 Roman WOLCZUK thinks that the main controversial issues in Ukrainian-Russian relations 
can be synthesized as follows: the recognition of borders (the problem of Crimea), the military 
balance between the two countries (the problem of the nuclear arsenal), the economic relations, 
the energy relations and the CIS integration. See his book Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy, 
1991- 2000, Routledge Curzon, London and New York, 2003, pp. 29-45.  
2 Ibidem, p. 51.  
3 Kathleen MIHALISKO, ”Security Issues in Ukraine and Belarus”, in Regina COWEN 
KARP (ed.), Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1993, pp. 225-257/p. 237.  
4 Anne de TINGUY, ”L’Ukraine, la Russie et l’Occident….cit.”, p. 10.  
5 About energy dependency, also see Margarita Mercedes BALMACEDA, ”Gas, Oil and the 
Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 
50, no. 2, March 1998, pp. 257-286.  
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major crisis in January 2006, which, as we shall see, has an impact on the Roma-
nian-Ukrainian relations as well. 
Ukraine also used its nuclear arsenal as a means of pressure for both Russia 
and the Western countries. In 1991, Ukraine made a real breakthrough when, two 
days after the Moscow putsch (August 24, 1991), it placed under its jurisdiction all 
military facilities on its territory, which comprised 30% of the Soviet tanks, 25% of 
the aviation, the Black Sea fleet and 176 ICBMs and 1180 warheads1. Having ac-
cepted at first to give up its nuclear facilities, it comes back on the decision when it 
realizes that it can use them as a strong instrument of negotiation. 
This new assertive position of Ukraine determined the Western countries to 
take it into account as a possible balancer for Russian imperialism in the region. 
This is why the relations between Ukraine and the Western countries went 
smoother and smoother; in 1994, the USA even offered security guarantees in ex-
change for the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by which Ukraine gave 
up its nuclear capabilities. 
This overview of the Ukrainian position in the region in the very first years of 
independence allows us to make several remarks concerning its situation. Ukraine 
had all the reasons to feel insecure from several points of view. First, by being seen 
rather as an appendix of Russia, than as a country of its own, it had to strive for a 
distinctive national identity and statehood. Secondly, it had to confront territorial 
claims from its neighbors – let us remember that, besides Russia and Romania, Po-
land could have had such claims, too. Third, it had to emancipate from the Russian 
sphere of influence. Last, but not least, economic and energetic dependence on 
Russia was, and still is, an important threat. 
All these legacies, be they more ancient, as the territorial or minorities ques-
tions, or more recent, like the economic dependency, deeply modeled the interna-
tional and regional behavior of Ukraine since 1991. Consequently, they also af-
fected its relations with Romania. 
Some Facts in Bilateral Relations 
One can reconstitute several important moments in the bilateral relations be-
tween Romania and Ukraine, which we shall consider turning points for our analy-
sis. The first stage of the relationship is marked by rather cool relations and mutual 
distrust. This might be considered normal, given the declaration of the Romanian 
government on the occasion of the independence of Ukraine: 
”The recognition of Ukraine’s independence and the desire to develop 
mutually beneficial Romanian-Ukrainian relations do not entail the recogni-
tion of the inclusion in the territory of the newly independent Ukrainian state 
of northern Bukovina, the Hertza region, the Khotyn region or the region of 
southern Bessarabia, which were forcibly annexed by the USSR and thereaf-
ter incorporated into the territorial structure of Ukraine on the basis of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact”2. 
                                                    
1 Cf. Roman WOLCZUK Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy…cit., p. 35. Kathleen Mihalisko 
confirms the number of missiles, but she raises the number of warheads to 1240 (see ”Security 
Issues…cit.”, p. 243).  
2 Declaration of the Romanian Government, 29 November 1991.  
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This declaration is followed by a similar one adopted in the Parliament. 
The bilateral diplomatic relations were established on February 2, 1992, and 
during the first year in office, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister visited Bucharest 
(September 1992). It’s an occasion for the official start of negotiations of a basic po-
litical treaty. The visit was not returned by his homologue until 1997, when the 
Treaty was finally signed. The two Parliaments sent visiting delegations to each 
other in 1992-1993. Nevertheless, the first forms of cooperation between the two 
countries appeared at a multi-lateral level, in June 1992, when both were founding 
members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, an initiative launched by Turkey 
and joined, besides Romania and Ukraine, by Bulgaria, Russia, the Republic of 
Moldova, Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Albania. 
Both countries were also involved in the four-sided framework of talks con-
cerning the situation in Transnistria, where the conflict had erupted on the 3rd of 
March, 1992. But Romania renounced to participate at these talks since 1993. 
While Ukraine manages to set up very good relations with Hungary and espe-
cially Poland1, negotiations for the Treaty with Romania are deadlocked during the 
period 1992-1995, mainly because the Ukrainian side does not accept the inclusion 
in the basic Treaty of a condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It is only in 
1995 that the two sides agree on the general form of the bilateral agreements: they 
were to be formed by a Treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation, a common 
Declaration of the two Heads of State which was to condemn the Ribben-
trop-Molotov Pact, and a document containing guidelines for the establishment of 
the regime of common frontiers, which was to touch the issue of the Serpents’ Is-
land, too. Negotiations are speeded up with the coming into office of the Roma-
nian President Constantinescu. Having political basic Treaties with all the 
neighbors was one of the preconditions for NATO accession; or, NATO was to take 
a decision on this issue in 1997, at the Madrid summit (7-9 July). The Treaty was 
signed a few weeks before the NATO summit, on the 2nd of June, and it comes into 
force, after ratification in the Parliaments, on the 22 of October 1997. It was heavily 
criticized by a significant part of the Romanian public opinion. While Romanians 
usually agree on foreign policy goals, it seems that this Treaty split the public opin-
ion into those in favor of the overcoming of the past, who also sustained the Treaty 
as a means of showing our good will to NATO, and those who consider it as a his-
torical treason of the Romanian ideal of re-unification and of the Romanians that 
live in nowadays Ukraine. 
The provisions of the Treaty were rather ambiguous concerning the disputed 
issues. The reference to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is replaced by a very vague 
allusion, in the Preamble, to the ”condemnation of the unjust acts of totalitarian re-
gimes and military dictatorship”2. The Parts agree that their common border is in-
violable (art. 2) and that their relations are founded on the respect, among others, 
of the Helsinki Final Act (which is the last international agreement mentioning that 
borders in Europe are recognized by all signatory parties and cannot be changed 
forcefully) (art. 1). Some vital issues are postponed: the regime of the common 
frontier is not decided upon, and the Treaty specifies in article 1.2 that it will be set 
                                                    
1 The Treaty of good neighborliness with Poland was signed in May 1992, only a few months 
after Ukrainian independence.  
2 ”Tratat privind buna vecinătate şi cooperare între România şi Ucraina”, Monitorul Oficial, 
partea I, nr. 157/16. 07. 1997, Preamble. 
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by an ulterior Treaty (which has only been signed six years after, in 2003). This also 
involves the issue of the delimitation of territorial waters and the Serpents’ Island. 
The article 5 states that the Parts ”will sustain each other in their efforts for integra-
tion into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures”. The most significant provi-
sions are those concerning the statute of minorities, set out in art. 13. The Roma-
nian side obtained an important victory through the inclusion of a reference to the 
Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe, which enhances the rights of mi-
norities. Nevertheless, the Treaty specifies that ”this recommendation does not re-
fer to collective rights and does not oblige the contracting Parties to grant to the re-
spective persons the right to a special territorial autonomy status based upon eth-
nic criteria” (art. 13.1). 
Most of the Romanian foreign policy decision-makers are rather optimist 
about the Treaty, especially for the article 13 concerning minorities1. Nevertheless, 
former Foreign Minister Meleşcanu (1992-1996) thinks that, although in general the 
Treaty reflects the Romanian position, the way in which it is applied by the 
Ukrainian party is discriminating for the Romanian minority: 
”Ukraine applies it on a reciprocal basis: the rights that you grant to the 
Ukrainian minority in Romania will be hold by us to the Romanian minority: 
they will have as many schools as ours have etc, thus ignoring the huge dif-
ference that exists between the two minorities, in terms of numbers as well as 
in terms of its creation through political decisions that have nothing to do 
with the right to self-determination…”2. 
The first bilateral visit at Presidents’ level took place on the occasion of the 
signing of the Treaty, when Leonid Kutchma came to Bucharest. The first Roma-
nian President to visit Kiev was Emil Constantinescu, in May 1999. Later, Ion Ili-
escu went to Kiev, Odessa (2002) and Tchernautsi (2003). Traian Băsescu visited 
Kiev in December 2004 and in February 2006. 
The border question was not completely set up until now. In 2003 was signed 
a ”Treaty concerning the regime of the Romanian-Ukrainian State frontier, collabo-
ration and mutual assistance on border issues”, which entered into force in May 
2004. The Treaty foresees the recognition of the borders agreed upon in the Roma-
nian-Soviet Treaty in 1961. But the issue of the territorial waters remains unsolved. 
Between 1998 and 2004, there were 24 rounds of negotiations. Romania has given 
up the idea of getting back the Serpents’ Island; the only issue that separates now 
the two sides is the delimitation of the continental shelf, which depends on 
whether the island is considered as inhabited or not. Romania brought the case be-
fore of the International Court of Justice in Hague, on the 16th of September 2004. It 
is the first case involving Romania before the ICJ. 
2004 is also the year of the construction, by Ukraine, of the Bastroe Channel (be-
gun on May 11). Before, the Ukrainian ships transiting the Danube had to use the 
Romanian channel of Sulina. It seems that this was bringing important losses to the 
Ukrainian economy, so it tried to find alternative solutions for navigation through 
the Danube Delta. But it also seems that the construction of the Bastroe Channel 
brings about very important ecological consequences for the Danube Delta, under-
                                                    
1 Interview with former Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Severin, Bruxelles, March 23, 
2006; interview with former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, Bucharest, January 2005.  
2 Interview with former Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Meleşcanu, Bucharest, October 
7, 2005.  
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lined by various ecologist organizations1 and by the Romanian government, who 
protested against the channel. The Ukrainian part infringed the Treaty signed in 
1997 and other international conventions2 by not consulting the Romanian part be-
fore the construction of the channel, which affects the Romanian portion of the 
Delta, sustains the Romanian government. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian part considers 
that, the works taking place on its territory, it should not have done so. 
The issue had an important international impact. Among the states, the gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations which mobilized against the con-
struction of the channel, because of its apparently disastrous ecological conse-
quences, are the USA, Germany, the EU, Ramsar-UNESCO, the Environmental Da-
nube Forum, etc3. The international media also gave accounts of the story4. After 
numerous requests from the Romanian part, bilateral talks on the issue began on 
July 20, 2004, at experts’ level. But they did not lead to significant evolutions. 
In order to solve this type of problems, in 2005 was created the Joint Presiden-
tial Commission Băsescu-Yushchenko: the two Presidents thought that a direct 
high-level relation would smooth bilateral relations. And indeed it did: they met 
three times in 2005 and Băsescu paid a visit to Kiev in February 2006, right after the 
energy crisis in Ukraine. They talked about setting up joint energy projects that 
would allow both countries not to depend on energy from Russia anymore, while 
Yushchenko declared that ”The enhancement of our dialogue [with Romania] is 
the most characteristic feature of the year 2005”5. 
Thus, if we were to trace some distinct periods of bilateral relations between 
Romania and Ukraine, we find the following: 
1. 1992-1995: divergent initial positions, when negotiations do not lead to any 
result, as none of the two countries wants to distance itself from the initial position. 
2. 1995-1997: negotiations are unblocked by a more pronounced tendency to 
compromise 
3. 1997-2003: the most important Treaties are signed and several high-level vis-
its take place. 
                                                    
1 The reports of several NGOs are quoted on the official site of the Romanian Foreign 
Ministry, www.mae.ro.  
2 These are: ”The Convention on the conservation of wild life and natural habitats in Europe”, 
Berna, 19 September 1979, under the aegis of the Council of Europe; ”The Convention on internatio-
nally significant wet areas, especially as habitat for the aquatic birds”, Ramsar, 1971; ”The Convention 
on the evaluation of trans-border impact on the environment”, Espoo, 1991; ”The Convention on the 
cooperation for the protection and sustainable utilization of the Danube river”, signed in Sofia, 1994; 
”The Convention on the access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice concerning environmental issues”, Bonn, 1979; ”The Convention on the protection of the 
world cultural and natural patrimony”, Paris, 1972; ”The Agreement between the Ministry of 
environment and territorial management of the Republic of Moldova, the Ministry of waters, forests 
and environmental protection in Romania and the Ministry of the environment and natural 
resources in Ukraine concerning the cooperation in the protected areas of Danube Delta and 
Lowe Prut”, Bucharest, 2000; ”The Agreement between the Romanian and Ukrainian governments 
concerning the cooperation in the field of trans-border waters management”, Galaţi, 1997, and last, 
but not least, ”The Treaty between Romania and Ukraine on the regime of the Romanian-Ukrainian 
State frontier, collaboration and mutual assistance in border issues”, Cernăuţi, 2003. Cf. the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mae.ro.  
3 Cf. the official site of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mae.ro  
4 See, for example, L’Express, 28 June 2004; Berliner Zeitung, 31 August 2004; Der Tagesspiegel, 
31 August 2004; Le Figaro, 27 September 2004.  
5 Cf. Ukrainian Presidential site, ww7.president.gov.ua/en/news/data/print/5817.html  
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4. 2003-2005: the issues of the Bastroe Channel and the delimitation of the con-
tinental shelf divide the two countries. 
5. Since the end of 2005, new peak of cooperation, based on joint energy pro-
jects and Black Sea Cooperation. 
Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy 
We will now move on to examine the second variable that we took into ac-
count in order to analyze the relations between Romania and Ukraine: the internal 
political regime. In applying this variable, we must look into the interaction be-
tween the domestic regimes of the two States, paying attention to the changes in 
the internal political configuration in each case. This is why a brief overview of the 
different governments and their foreign policies is necessary. Then, we will try to 
mirror the changes of governmental majority in the two countries with the periods 
of ups and downs in the bilateral relation. 
In Romania, the first years after 1989 were of confusion about foreign policy. 
The turn towards West was not yet very obvious under Iliescu, who had a very bad 
external image, being considered a neo-communist. The decisive move that he 
makes towards a Western orientation of foreign policy comes with the signing of 
the Partnership for Peace, in 1994, and the Snagov Declaration in 1995, by which the 
entire Romanian political class (represented by all the parliamentary parties) affirms 
its intention to support the objective of the European integration for Romania. 
The change of government in 1996 brings in Emil Constantinescu, a known in-
tellectual (former President of the Bucharest University) and member of the ”de-
mocratic opposition”. He has a very good image with the Western countries. He 
speeds up the negotiations for the Basic Political Treaty with Ukraine – observers 
say that in order to get a positive answer about Romania’s accession to NATO 
membership, which was to be decided in 19971, but the former President denies it2. 
The Treaty is finally signed in 1997. The way in which Romania accepted, in 1997, to 
sign the Treaty in its present form is significantly due to the change of government 
in 1996. While former Minister of Foreign Affairs Meleşcanu thinks that maybe we 
could have obtained more3, which means that he would have continued negotiat-
ing, for the new President in office it was important to show determination in over-
coming legacies from the past and showing good will to the international commu-
nity. So, firstly, the new President had to prove his commitment to international 
norms of cooperation and good neighborliness. Second, he had to prove that he was 
able to sign a Treaty that was not very popular among Romanian public opinion. 
The former President says that it was only possible to conclude this Treaty in his 
first year in office, because the great capital of trust he was enjoying in the country, 
and because he was known for his anti-communist orientation and thus would not 
                                                    
1
 Among others: V.G. BĂLEANU, ”In the Shadow of Russia…cit.”, p. 24; Roman 
WORONOWYCZ, ”Romania, Ukraine Settle Territorial Dispute”, The Ukrainian Weekly, vol. LXV, 
no. 23, June 8, 1997, etc.  
2 Interview with Emil Constantinescu, former President of Romania, January 2006.  
3 Interview with former Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Meleşcanu, Bucharest, October 
7, 2005 
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be perceived as selling his country to the Russians1. The former President seems to 
be ready to forget the past and found bilateral relations on new bases, on the model 
of Poland which, he says, had much more to lose than Romania if we think in terms 
of historical borders, and yet signed a treaty with Ukraine some time earlier2. He is 
also the one who came up with the idea of a network of tri-lateral cooperations 
around Romania, the first of which was Poland-Romania-Ukraine. 
The debates around the Treaty can also tell us more about the way foreign pol-
icy decisions are made in Romania and the weight of different internal factors, 
such as the relations between the responsible institutions or the public opinion. 
The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adrian Severin, seems to have had some 
disagreements with the President on the way negotiations were run: 
”The fact that M. Ceauşu3 almost constantly made declarations in the 
media about the negotiations before telling me what was happening, or the 
way in which he tried to take his mandate directly from the President, did 
not serve the cause too well”4. 
Moreover, the Minister even reversed some of the decisions of the chief nego-
tiator appointed by the President5. As for the influence of the public opinion, we 
can say that the Treaty was signed in its present form in spite of vociferous pro-
tests of mass-media or civic associations, a fact that even confirmed by the former 
Minister6. Several critics were brought to the Treaty, beginning with the ”historical 
treason”of leaving behind Romanian territories. Dominuţ Pădurean, Professor of 
History at the Romanian Naval Academy and author of the single monograph of 
the Serpent’s Island7, thinks that the Treaty is ”the worst and the most criminal 
Treaty signed by Romania in the last decades”8. Paul Nistor points out that all the 
public debate around the Treaty only emphasized the problematic historical heri-
tage, instead of revealing the positive aspects of the bilateral relations9. The atti-
tude of the public opinion towards Ukraine is also showed by a recent opinion 
poll. Measuring the ”temperature” of the sentiments of the Romanian population 
towards foreign countries, the poll placed Ukraine in the ”rather cold” zone, fol-
lowed only by Russia and the Arab States10. 
We should not look for the impact of public opinion on decision-making in 
Ukraine either, where observers say that ”as the civil society is weak, the State de-
fines by its own the country’s national interests”11. 
                                                    
1 Interview with former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, Bucharest, January 2006.  
2 Ibidem. 
3 The chief negotiator of the Treaty, appointed by the President.  
4 Adrian SEVERIN, Gabriel ANDREESCU, Locurile unde se construieşte Europa, Polirom, Iaşi, 
2000, p. 49.  
5 Ibidem, p. 50.  
6 Ibidem, p. 54.  
7 Dominuţ PĂDUREAN, Insula Şerpilor, Editura Muntenia, Constanţa, 2002.  
8 Mircea LUNGU, interview with Dominut Pădurean, in Victor RONCEA (ed.), Axa…cit., 
p. 215.  
9 Paul NISTOR, ”Problema memoriei în relaţiile internaţionale. Tratatul româno-ucrainean 
(1997)”, Xenopoliana, X, nr. 1-4, 2002, pp. 153-160.  
10 Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Percepţia opiniei publice din România asupra politicii externe 
şi a relaţiilor internaţionale, October 2005.  
11 Oleksandr DERGATCHEV, ”L’Ukraine entre l’Europe et l’Eurasie, une voie semée 
d’embûches”, in Anne de TINGUY (ed.), L’Ukraine...cit., pp. 111-125/p. 121.  
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The next legislature brought back Ion Iliescu as a President and a very strong 
government who had to deal with the issue of the Bastroe Channel. Since 2004, the 
new President, Traian Băsescu, continuously asserts his role in foreign policy and 
his strong orientation towards the strategic partnership with the USA, while hav-
ing a rather cold relation with Russia. This stance, combined with the new orienta-
tion of Ukrainian foreign policy brought about by the Orange Revolution, led to a 
rapprochement between the two countries. 
As for the Ukrainian part, the first elections after the independence were won 
by the incumbent President, Leonid Kravtchuk. He is a former communist party 
leader who managed to take power by taking advantage of the 1991 coup d’État in 
Moscow, and who tried to gain legitimacy by playing the independence card. His 
orientation in foreign policy was towards distancing Ukraine from Russia, by 
avoiding to be attracted into a reconstruction of the former USSR through the CIS; 
in order to do this, he sought alliances with Central European states, such as those 
of the Visegrad Group and Germany. In a documented study about foreign policy 
during the Kravtchuk regime, Charles Furtado shows that nationalism was cer-
tainly not an important determinant of Ukraine’s foreign policy1. On the contrary, 
Ilya Prizel sustains that Kravchuk’s foreign policy was nationalistic, following a 
post-colonial pattern in which leaders try to legitimize themselves through foreign 
policy. Thus, Kravchuk’s pro-Westernism is a mere instrumentalization of foreign 
policy for electoral purposes. But it didn’t pay, as he lost the 1994 elections2. 
They were won by Leonid Kutchma, originating from the Eastern part of 
Ukraine and former director of the biggest nuclear missile plant in the world. 
Kutchma became Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1992, under Kravtchuk, and ever 
since there was a marked rivalry between the two leaders in order to gain support 
from the population. While Kutchma was seen as rather pro-Russian, predicating 
an Eurasianist doctrine that linked Ukraine to the former Soviet space3, he man-
aged to pursue some important economic reforms which made him popular. A 
marked pro-Russian orientation in foreign policy is characteristic of his first term 
in office, while beginning with 1997, he becomes a virulent critic of the CIS and he 
pushes for alternative forms of regional integration, such as GUAM. Another shift 
intervenes in 2000, when Kutchma has to face an internal scandal that might have 
costed him his position; he is now supported by the Russians, with whom he is 
obliged to make important compromises. 
Both countries changed government in 2004. While in Ukraine, that was the 
result of violent mass protest against the falsified elections that tried to impose the 
pro-Russian Yanukovitch as a winner, the Romanian President Băsescu adopted 
the orange as the official color of his electoral campaign, with a direct reference to 
the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. He also went to Kiev in order to assist to the 
confirmation of Yushchenko as a President. Thus, the relation between the two 
Presidents debuted under very promising auspices. Yushchenko, the new Ukrain-
ian President, is well-known for his anti-Russian and pro-American orientation, as 
                                                    
1 Charles F. FURTADO, Jr, ”Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine”, Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 81-104.  
2 Ilya PRIZEL, National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, 
and Ukraine, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 374.  
3 See Kuchma’s inaugural Presidency speech, quoted in Stephen R. BURANT, “Foreign 
Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, 
no. 7, November 1995, p. 1138.  
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well as President Băsescu. In spite of this, during 2005, there were several confron-
tational declarations from the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs linked to the Bas-
troe Channel and to the negotiations for the settlement of the Transdnistrean prob-
lem1. But the personal relation established between Băsescu and Yushchenko 
seems to contribute to a better relation between the two countries. Ukraine and 
Romania are new partners in the framework of the Black Sea Cooperation (we 
should not forget that the Black Sea area is the main foreign policy preoccupation 
of Băsescu’s administration), along with Georgia; it is with these two countries that 
Romania is trying to build a strategic partnership, and we must also note that these 
are the most pro-American countries in the Black Sea region. President Yushchenko 
announced, after Băsescu’s visit to Kiev in February, that Ukrainian bilateral pri-
orities in 2006 are agreements with USA, Poland, and Romania2. As for Poland, it is 
the country that had best relations with Ukraine since 1992. 
 
Table 1 
Influence of the Domestic Regimes on the Bilateral Relations 
Period Romanian domestic regime 
Ukrainian domestic 
regime Bilateral relations 
1991-1992 Iliescu, undecided Kravchuk – pro-Westerner 
Beginning of diplomatic 
relations and negotiations 
on the Treaty 
1992-1994 
Iliescu, undecided 





Beginning of cooperation 
in multilateral framework 
(BSEC) 
1994-1996 Iliescu, rather pro-Westerner 
Kutchma – 







1997: Basic Treaty 
First bilateral Presidential 
level visits 
1999-2000 Constantinescu Kutchma  
2000-2004 Iliescu, pro-Westerner 
Kutchma forced by 
the Russians into 
their camp 
2003: Treaty on State frontier 
2004: construction of Bastroe 
Channel 
Romanian case to the ICJ 
on the delimitation of the 
continental shelf 
2004-2006 Băsescu, pro-American 
Yushchenko, 
pro-Westerner 
ICJ and Bastroe issues, 




Black Sea Cooperation 
                                                    
1 See especially the Romanian newspaper Ziua, 13 and 14 June, 2005, but also Victor 
RONCEA (ed.), op. cit., pp. 45-51.  
2 ww7.president.gov.ua/en/news/data/print/6045.html  
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The comparative table shows no superposition between the mandates of the 
different legislatures in the two countries and the evolution of bilateral relations. It 
is very difficult to find a linkage between domestic regime and foreign policy espe-
cially in the first years of bilateral relations between Romania and Ukraine. Both 
countries were in transition; both were rather preoccupied with internal reforms, 
economic and social problems. It is true that the basic political Treaty was signed 
once the democratic opposition gained power in Romania, but the Treaty was be-
ing negotiated for a very long time already. Moreover, the fact that Ukraine had no 
problem in finding agreements on basic Treaties with her other Eastern European 
neighbors in the first years after independence (like Poland or Hungary) does not 
point to any reluctance of its domestic regime in strengthening ties with neighbor-
ing countries, in spite of the existing problems of minorities or borders. The only 
regularity that we can notice is that relations were better between Romania and 
Ukraine when both Presidents had a pronounced, almost emphatic, pro-Western 
orientation and a very marked reticence to Russia: Constantinescu with Kutchma 
in his anti-Russian period (1996-2000), and Băsescu with Yushchenko (2005-2006). 
External Factors: Distribution of Power 
and/or Institutional Pressures 
For almost 50 years, the international system could only be thought in bipolar 
terms. There were the two superpowers and their allies, while very few countries 
in the world were genuinely neutral. The end of the Cold War was followed by a 
rather brief period of euphoria, which led some analysts to consider that the ”end 
of history” was approaching1. In time, States began to re-define their national in-
terests, by re-considering the international distribution of power. The relations be-
tween Romania and Ukraine can also be viewed through the lens of national in-
terest, defined, as in Morgenthau, in terms of power2. Meanwhile, if we look at the 
international distribution of power, this will not tell us much in terms of variables: 
power as such is not a variable in our case, since we cannot assess whether the 
power of the USA, for example, increased or decreased since 1991. Moreover, if 
measured in absolute terms, the power of Ukraine was greater in the first years of 
the 1990s, when it had control over the nuclear weapons and over the Black Sea 
Fleet. Nonetheless, with no allies, it was rather isolated on the international arena. 
Thus, we can say that Ukraine is a more powerful state nowadays, through the 
good relations that it maintains with her Western neighbors and with Western 
powers in general. 
So, instead of taking power, measured quantitatively, as a variable, we should 
rather consider the attitude of the significant powers in the system towards the in-
ternational arena and towards the two countries that we study. 
If Romania starts with a great capital of international sympathy after 1989, it 
loses it soon because of internal unrest (the events of June 1990, student’s manifes-
tations in Piaţa Universităţii and the arrival of the minors), and because the new 
                                                    
1 Francis FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York, 1992.  
2 Hans MORGENTAHU, Politics Among Nations, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948.  
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government in Bucharest is seen as a neo-communist1. As for Ukraine, the Western 
States are rather skeptical about its capacity to be an independent State2. Moreover, 
the refusal of Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal attracted the mistrust of the 
West, at a time when relations between USA and Russia went rather smoothly: 
”This only brought a great amount of Western criticism of Ukraine’s 
policy as short-sighted, irresponsible, and dangerous. Kravchuk’s intransi-
gence and misplaced assertiveness created a perception of Ukraine as a 
spoiler state bent on obstructing the emergence of a new security system 
stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok”3. 
Both Romania and Ukraine had a cautious start in foreign policy orientations. 
Geographical proximity and historical ties with Russia prompted the two coun-
tries not to be very audacious in their orientation towards the West. This is why, 
in a first stage, both tried to keep their options open. Moreover, for Romania, the 
dismantling of the USSR was an opportunity to try to re-gain the territories lost 
after the Second World War: this is why its relations with Moldova were very ro-
mantic in a first period. Northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia were also 
concerned. This is why, taking into account national interest, Romania pressed for 
the recognition of the historical injustices done through the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact. On the contrary, Ukrainian national interest went in the opposite sense: as 
we showed in the fist section, this country had to consolidate its statehood, being 
threatened by minorities and territorial claims from several of its neighbors4. As 
documented by John Dunne in 1994: 
”Ukraine still lacks a consistent and detailed security policy. This lack of 
a detailed policy is evidenced in the mutability of policies such as Ukraine’s 
’block free’ status and its ’non-nuclear’ identity. As it struggled to take ac-
count of domestic and international circumstances, Ukrainian policy has been 
reactive rather than pro-active”5. 
Under these circumstances, the relation between the two States can be seen as a 
zero-sum game: what is lost by one of them is gained by the other: mutual gains are 
not possible. Thus, a cooperative logic cannot be reached in the bilateral relation. 
By 1995, Romania manages to define its two most important foreign policy ob-
jectives: accession to NATO and integration into the EU. As these organizations 
impose very strict membership political criteria, revision of the existing frontiers 
cannot go hand in hand with the Romanian objective of integration. This is why 
getting back the territories in question is not a viable perspective anymore. Once 
having renounced to territorial claims, the relations with Ukraine can start afresh. 
                                                    
1 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Meleşcanu complains about the very bad image 
of the government in international fora, which was the most important challenge that he had to 
fight (Interview with Teodor Meleşcanu, former MAE of Romania, October 2005). We should 
nevertheless place his statement in the context: he changed party and is now member of the PNL, 
the main challenger of his former party.  
2 Jean-Yves HAINE, ”La politique occidentale vis-à-vis de l’Ukraine”, in L’Ukraine et la 
stabilité en Europe, Actes du Colloque organisé par l’Institut Royal Supérieur de défense, Bruxelles, 
1994, pp. 15-27/p. 19-20. He also says that ”All through 1992 and 1993, it was only the nuclear 
aspect that interested the West” (p. 24).  
3 Ilya PRIZEL, National Identity and Foreign Policy…cit., p. 383.  
4 Kathleen MIHALISKO, ”Security Issues…cit.”., p. 246.  
5 John F. DUNNE, ”Ukraine’s Continuing Security Dilemma. A Summary Update”, in 
L’Ukraine et la stabilité en Europe, cit., pp. 29-41/p. 29.  
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By this time, Ukraine too settles to a policy of non-alignment with Russia and 
gains recognition from the USA and Western European countries. It manages to 
stay away from deepened integration with the CIS and signs the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and START I, in 1994: both treaties are mediated by the USA, which in turn 
offer security guarantees and financial aid to Ukraine. Western countries now 
overcome their doubts as to Ukraine’s capacity to become an independent State; 
moreover, they are more and more interested in having a democratic country bor-
dering both the EU (in the perspective of enlargement) and Russia1. In 1994, 
Ukraine signs the Partnership for Peace; in 1995, it becomes a member of the Coun-
cil of Europe; in 1996, it sets as a long-term foreign policy objective the integration 
into the EU. Thus, the second stage of Romanian-Ukrainian relations coincides 
with the rapprochement of both countries to Western organizations, while the 
third stage – signing of the bilateral treaties and high-level visits – intervenes while 
Romania hopes for accession to NATO – and finally gets it in 2002, and Ukraine 
tries to find alternative options to CIS integration. 
It is interesting to note that both countries are preoccupied by the way in 
which they are seen at the international level, by submitting their position to inter-
national forums. The account of former President Constantinescu about the way in 
which the issue of the basic Treaty was settled is very relevant in this sense: 
”It all took place at the OSCE meeting2 […] Before going to Lisbon, I re-
ceived a report from the SIE (Foreign Intelligence Service) on the position 
that Ukraine was to take at the OSCE. They were prepared for an attack 
against Romania, which was presented as a neo-imperialist State who does 
not want to sign the Treaty, maintains a situation of instability and does not 
recognize Ukrainian frontiers, unlike Poland […] In the context of the change 
of government [in Romania], Kutchma, who had enough experience, post-
poned the manifestation of force in order to see our reaction in Lisbon […] 
Having this report, I asked for a meeting with vice-President Al Gore and I 
insisted that this meeting should take place before Gore’s meeting with 
Kutchma. And my meeting with Kuthcma was fixed after his meeting with 
the Americans […] I told Gore that we will solve the problem of the Treaty 
with Ukraine on the Polish model […] and he told this to Kutchma […] But I 
told him that the condition was a privileged attention in this Treaty to the Ro-
manian minorities. And here, we would need American pressures […] This 
was the basis of the Treaty”3. 
The European Union and the USA seem both interested in the development of 
Romanian-Ukrainian relation, as they congratulated the two governments for the 
signing of the Treaty4. 
Meanwhile, the foreign policy orientations of Russia are an important determi-
nant, especially for Ukraine, but for Romania too. But, unlike Romania, Ukraine is 
part of the geopolitical space considered by Russia to be its ”near abroad”, with 
                                                    
1 Cf. Anne de TINGUY, ”L’Ukraine, la Russie et l’Occident….cit.”, p. 12.  
2 In Lisbon, December 1996. 
3 Interview with former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, January 2006. The story is 
confirmed by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin, in Adrian SEVERIN, Gabriel 
ANDREESCU, Locurile unde se construieşte Europa…cit., pp. 47-48.  
4 For the EU, see the statement of the Presidency, the Hague, 2 June 1997; for the USA, ”Bill 
Clinton felicită preşedinţii României şi Ucrainei pentru semnarea Tratatului de bază”, Adevărul, 
4 June 1997, p. 9.  
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which it pretends a very special relationship. Immediately after the dismantling of 
the Soviet empire, Russia had a period of internal instability which did not allow it 
to be too assertive in foreign policy. It was the period when the ”new thinking” of 
the Gorbatchev-Shevarnadze couple still survived, while Moscow also depended 
on the foreign aid for survival. This changed beginning with 1993: 
”Key policy documents adopted in the spring and fall of 1993, including 
the foreign policy concept and the new military doctrine, were characterized 
by marked suspicion of Western intentions, resentment against Russia’s ap-
parent subordination, complaints about painful economic reforms allegedly 
imposed by the West, and a resolve to restore the country’s global position”1. 
Thus, at the end of 1993, the main objective of Russia’s foreign policy becomes 
the re-integration of the former Soviet republics, including, of course, Ukraine2. 
This line becomes even harder after the appointment of Evgheny Primakov as a 
Foreign Minister in 1996: he wishes to restore Russia as a great power and does not 
consider the former Soviet republics as sovereign States, but as Russia’s ”near 
abroad”3. Relations with Ukraine are paid a special attention: in 1997, the two 
countries sign a basic political Treaty through which the irreversibility of the dis-
mantling of the USSR is recognized. Thus, Russia tries to get closer to Ukraine so 
that the latter does not seek accession to NATO or the EU, while Ukraine accepts 
this, hoping to soften Russia’s position on these issues. Meanwhile, it also tries to 
escape Russian influence by taking the initiative of the GUAM in 1997. In 2000, 
Russia elaborates a new military doctrine and national security concept that de-
picts NATO expansion as a threat4, and Russia’s foreign policy becomes even more 
assertive. Thus, Russia manages to re-impose itself on the international arena. Af-
ter the terrorist attacks of September 11, it softens its position on NATO enlarge-
ment, while still maintaining its claims to ”peace-keeping” in its ”near abroad”. 
Since 2003, through bilateral agreements and investments, Ukraine becomes more 
and more dependent on Russian state-controlled energy sector, as well as trade. 
In the context of the need to integrate with the West ant of the perceived threat 
from Russia, the relation between the two countries we study is not to be thought 
in terms of a zero-sum game anymore. If we are to put it in realist terms, Romania 
and Ukraine are balancing Russia on the issue of the energy. But we can also think 
of the latest evolutions of the bilateral relations in liberal institutionalist terms: by 
getting in touch with international institutions, the two States better understood 
and defined their interests and thus they came to cooperate for absolute gains, and 
not for relative ones, that is, by measuring whether the other has more to gain from 
the cooperation5. This change of perspective might also be linked to the socializa-
tion of decision-makers in international organizations: Adrian Severin, the Foreign 
Minister that signed the basic Treaty, appears to think in these terms: 
                                                    
1 Janusz BUGAJSKI, Cold Peace...cit., p. 8.  
2 Ibidem.  
3 Ibidem, p. 11.  
4 Ibidem, p. 14.  
5 For a theoretical account of the absolute/relative gains, see the debate between John 
MEARSHEIMER, ”The False Promise of International Institutions”, in Michael E. BROWN et al. 
(eds.), Theories of War and Peace, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1998, 
pp. 329-383, and Robert O. KEOHANE, Lisa MARTIN, ”The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, 
in Ibidem, pp. 384-396.  
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”I tried to convince the Ukrainian partners that this Treaty must not be 
seen as a trade contract […], but as an association contract; not as a contract 
in which one side tries to sell the merchandise at its greatest price and the 
other to offer the smallest price, but a Treaty in which we must put together 
all that we have best in order to get something superior”1. 
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This overview of the complex relations established among the important pow-
ers in the international system allows us to seize some regularities that link the atti-
                                                    
1 Adrian SEVERIN, Gabriel ANDREESCU, Locurile unde se construieşte Europa…cit., p. 52.  
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tude of these powers to the two countries that we analyze and their bilateral rela-
tions. Thus, we can see that in the absence of a marked interest from either Russia 
or the Western powers to the region (the period 1992-1995), the bilateral relations 
do not have a promising evolution. The two States are more preoccupied by sur-
vival and hard national interest than by cooperation. The situation changes in a 
second period, when, on the one hand, Western organizations are more and more 
interested in consolidating democracy in both Romania and Ukraine, and on the 
other hand, Russia begins to re-assert its sphere of influence. Better relations are 
thus supported by both the pressures from the West to democratize and to have 
good bilateral relations in the region (institutional pressures), and the danger that 
represents for both countries the re-emergence of Russia as a great power. The con-
sensus reached by Romania and Ukraine can thus be explained following two 
paradigms of the International Relations theory: a liberal paradigm would stress 
the influence of the Western powers, exerted through institutions, while a realist 
explanation would purport to the need to balance Russia’s increasing power. 
After September 11, the two tendencies that we signaled soften: the West is 
more preoccupied by containing terrorism, especially in the Middle East, than by 
the democratization of Eastern Europe. Russia, in turn, seizes the opportunity of 
the fight against terrorism in order to deal with separatist tendencies at its borders, 
and seeks an understanding with the USA. Immediately after, in 2003-2005, prob-
lems appear in the bilateral relation between Romania and Ukraine. It is true nev-
ertheless that, while the link between international pressure and the signing of the 
Basic Treaty is rather obvious, we cannot establish a direct link between these later 
events and the bilateral problems. What we can do is point to a regularity that ap-
pears in the superposition of the international evolution and the bilateral relations, 
which might prove significant. 
Beginning with 2005, it seems that the region becomes more and more polar-
ized: not only the position of Russia hardens, but also that of the USA, Romania 
and Ukraine. Now, we can almost see the creation of two camps which, if they are 
not yet in conflict, launch rather confrontational declarations. USA creates military 
camps on the Romanian territory; Russia cuts energy supplies to countries with 
pro-American regimes in its ”near abroad” (Ukraine, Georgia) and promotes inter-
nal legislation in order to stop foreign (i.e., European and American) funding for 
Russian civic associations. In the context of this polarization, Romania and Ukraine 
cooperate for balancing Russia, whose rise is seen by the two countries as the most 
dangerous development in the region. 
So, if the pattern of cooperation created by institutional pressures from West-
ern powers and organizations is more visible in the 1997-2003 phase, the recent po-
larization of the regional environment enhances a pattern of cooperation out of 
fear and points to a balancing behavior of the two States. 
 
The analysis of our three major variables – historical legacies, domestic regime 
and international environment – leads us to several conclusions as to the impact of 
each variable on the relations between Romania and Ukraine. First, we can notice 
that historical legacies have more impact in the absence of other types of incen-
tives. In the zero-point of bilateral relations, as well as in the absence of interna-
tional pressures or external threat, the historical legacies are perceived as a hinder-
ing factor of cooperation. 
Second, as far as the domestic regime is concerned, its impact seems rather 
low, as the changes of governmental majority does not superpose on the ups and 
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downs of the bilateral relations. But we should stress an important aspect con-
cerning the internal factor: when the two governments are markedly Western-ori-
ented, the relations between them are smoother, like the periods 1996-2000 and 
2005-2006. This does not happen when only one of the two is pro-Western 
(1992-1994 and 2000-2004). 
Finally, the international and regional environments appear as very important 
factors that shape bilateral relations in our case. These can be interpreted from both 
a liberal institutionalist perspective and a realist one: in our case, the interpreta-
tions converge, even though they offer different explanations. From a liberal insti-
tutionalist perspective, we would say that the politics of different international or-
ganizations (such as the Council of Europe, the EU, or NATO) to consolidate de-
mocracy and good relations of neighborliness in the region managed to export 
rules of cooperation that were taken over by the two countries in question. From a 
realist point of view, it is rather the fear of Russia that determined the two coun-
tries to create ties that would help both of them to emancipate from their powerful 
regional neighbor. 
 
